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VALUING THE WAIVER:
THE REAL BEAUTY OF Ex ANTE OVER
Ex POST
Robert C. Hockettt
First, thank you to Professor Geoffrey Miller and indeed all of my
co-panelists for their stimulating remarks, and to Professor Dent,
Dean Simson, and the students of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law for your invitation to take part in this year's George A.
beet Business Law Symposium. It is a great pleasure and, indeed, a
great honor to be here with so many distinguished practitioners, scho-
lars, and participants.
In view of my limited time this morning, I am going to confine
myself to saying just a bit about one particular feature that I find par-
ticularly attractive about not only Professor Miller's very interesting
proposal, but also about many cognate proposals-indeed all propos-
als of a particular kind of which Professor Miller's is one elegant in-
stance-namely, what I shall call "voluntary, ex ante waiver" propos-
als. And in view of this feature I am going to recommend, in conclu-
sion, that we consider experimenting with a variety of proposals of
this kind.
First to situate my remarks: what I find most attractive about vol-
untary, ex ante waiver proposals is best understood by reference to
several particularly interesting features of the current public debate
over corporate attorney-client privilege and the work-product doc-
trine. The features that I have in mind are directly traceable, I believe,
to a cluster of acute uncertainties-conceptual, epistemic, and just
plain empirical uncertainties-that afflict all of the current discus-
sions. And the great beauty of ex ante waiver proposals, I think, is
precisely that they offer us means of neutralizing, dissolving, or side-
stepping those very uncertainties.
t Assistant Professor of Law, CorneU Law School. Warm thanks to Geoff Miller, George
Dent, Gary Sirmson, and the participants in the 2006 George A. Leet Business Law Symposium
at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Many thanks also to the editors and staff of
the Case Western Reserve Law Review, in particular Elizabeth LeBlanc.
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I begin first by noting that the current debate over attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine in the corporate context is
fraught with a truly surprising degree of overstatement and, indeed,
downright irony. Consider, for instance, these two topical examples:
Presently the executive branch-in particular the Department of
Justice (not the SEC, of course, Professor Goldschmid and Mr.
Humes!)--oftentimes speaks in terms reminiscent of those commonly
employed by advocates of the inquisitorial, rather than the adversar-
ial, system of justice when discussing the privilege. You hear advo-
cates of pre-trial privilege-waiver referring to the importance of "get-
ting at the truth," and of how privilege gets in the way of that desid-
eratum. Or you hear the old saw that if one really has nothing to hide,
then one should not be concerned about retaining the privilege in any
event.
The irony here, of course, is that this is the same branch of gov-
ernment that has been notorious for its resistance to public scrutiny of
its own internal operations-on precisely the grounds commonly
proffered in defense of the privilege. Hence, for example, when mem-
bers of the press and public interest groups sought to learn who the
members of the Vice President's "energy task force" were a few years
back, the answer given was that disclosure of this information might
chill the frank, internal deliberation necessary to the proper function-
ing of the task force. (That of course sounds a good bit like what ad-
vocates of the privilege in the corporate context say, as will be borne
out further in my second example, just below.) And so the same
branch of government that impugns privilege as a refuge of scoun-
drels' appeals, in rebuffing the press and the public, emphasizes the
importance of confidentiality and the privilege that protects it. Irony
number one.
Now consider this one: some members of the corporate bar, and
here I am thinking, in particular, of the hearings held by the ABA task
force on attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine in the
last several years, have spoken as though compliance with the law
and the assurance of such compliance were always best viewed as
purely internal matters. The firms "really want to abide by the law,"
we are assured, and will be better positioned to do so if employees
and all others internal to firm are able to speak frankly and with full
candor (like the members of the Vice President's "energy task
force"!), without fear of excessive scrutiny, reprisal, or prosecution to
inside counsel. "So," these folk are in effect saying, "we really think
that the public interest in corporate right-doing is best served by the-
privately employed-privilege."
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That is, of course, somewhat ironic in itself. But much more ironic
is the fact that some members of the bar in some of these ABA task
force proceedings I have mentioned are now invoking the specter of
an all-powerful, inquisitorial government systematically stripping
firms and their officers of cherished and time-honored corporate
rights in the wake of Enron and other high-profile scandals. They
sound almost like Lord Coke, or the Boston Tea Party patriots. If you
have not read these proceedings, I heartily recommend some of them
for a good chortle: you can actually read members of the corporate
bar talking in terms that we associate with the public advocacy of
Amy Goodman, Noam Chomsky, or the ACLU. This is irony number
two.
Now a crowning irony in the pair of positions I have just sketched,
of course, is, first, that surely the past five years have afforded us at
least some reason to be skeptical about the adequacy of internal, pri-
vate policing by firms alone to ensure that upper level employees are
not engaged in what amounts to public (i.e., criminal) wrongdoing.
And second, it also seems a bit fanciful, to put the point mildly, to
suggest that the executive branch, particularly the current personnel
occupying it, are out to "stick it to the corporate man," so to speak. Or
are "out to get" businesses, or are plotting some systematic stripping,
from American businesses across the board, of all cherished preroga-
tives and traditional rights. The current administration might have
appreciated the contributions made by Ralph Nader to the 2000 elec-
tions, but they are probably not about to name him to an SEC com-
missionership.
So again, a bit of irony, and a bit of overstatement in what has be-
come the customary rhetoric surrounding recent corporate scandals
and their legal fallout. But now the question becomes, how do we
account for this? Is this just a case of the usual gassing that accompa-
nies vigorous public discussion in the wake of scandal or controversy,
or is there something perhaps that is a bit more unique to the present
context?
It seems to me that there a number of possible ways to account for
the ironies I have mentioned, some of them admittedly familiar across
contexts, but others indeed a bit more unique to the present context. It
is in connection with the latter that I find ex ante waiver proposals so
very intriguing.
Now, as for the more prosaic explanations for the ironies I have
cited, first of all, admittedly, part of the story must lie in the nature of
contemporary public discourse itself, considered more generally. This
is a discourse that tends familiarly to focus on extreme situations,
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sensational stories, and dramatic archetypes, whose significance can
be telegraphed quickly in sound-byte form. So, of course, we get sim-
plified slogans and hyperbole and nightmare scenarios painted before
us-not just in the present, corporate scandal context, but in any con-
text involving public controversy.
Second, and again admittedly, if you are an advocate of a position,
I suppose you are naturally going to tend to emphasize the horror
stories, or the most dramatic exemplars, of what those who share your
position find frightful. You will naturally tend to do that in any advo-
cative context, not just the present, corporate scandal context. So this,
too, is hardly surprising.
And yet, nevertheless, there seems to me to be one feature unique
to the present context, the context of corporate wrongdoing and the
role of corporate counsel, that I suspect plays a more important role in
accounting for the particular ironies and overstatements that I have
briefly cited. This unique causal factor has to do with something pe-
culiar to the nature of corporate conduct and misconduct itself, along
with its aftermath. It also has to do with the nature of the attorney's
canonically "dual role" as a "zealous advocate" for the client on the
one hand, and as an "officer of the court" or of the justice system on
the other. In short, I think what we have is a particularly acute infor-
mation problem, a largely empirical information problem, in the con-
text of corporate wrongdoing and the investigation of corporate
wrongdoing. This problem, I believe, uniquely lends itself to over-
statement in advocacy of one side or the other when we talk about the
propriety or otherwise of waiving attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine.
Let me illustrate by first very quickly rehearsing-though in a
public-interest-weighted way-the classic arguments in favor of at-
torney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine on the one hand
and those against them on the other. As I do so, please note how the
commonly taken positions in respect of these issues connect to acute
information problems. For it is this feature, I believe, that ultimately
lends ex ante privilege-waiver proposals their valid claim to our atten-
tion.
First, on the side of privilege, what is the public interest commonly
invoked? The idea, is it not, is that you facilitate ex ante compliance
with the law within the firm by enabling corporate employees to
speak fully and frankly, in full candor, with in-house counsel. An oft-
unstated premise here is that the law is fraught with ambiguity. It of-
ten is difficult, in consequence, to know whether one is complying.
And so in-house counsel require frank disclosure by personnel of
[Vol. 57:2
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their deeds, both actual and contemplated. And this disclosure is in
turn facilitated by the privilege.
Next, what is the public interest commonly thought to under-
write-waiver or full availability of all pertinent information to pros-
ecutors and plaintiffs? Well, it is that waiver of privilege facilitates
ex-post rectification of wrongs, is it not? Because, as the argument
goes, you cannot do justice without getting at the truth. (And indeed,
as this argument sometimes adds, if justice then is done ex post in this
way we are also going to provide the right set of incentives ex ante to
future potential wrongdoers.)
Now, imagine two cases in which you have no ambiguity, no un-
certainty as to what is actually occurring or has actually occurred at
all. The first such case is one in which all personnel within the firm
are "certainly innocent," so to speak; there is clearly no wrongdoing
afoot; we know this with full confidence. In this case (should it ever
actually be encountered), it is very easy to argue that the privilege and
its rationale are simply unimplicated. For here there is, by hypothesis,
simply nothing to hide or to seek advice about. As a potential defen-
dant in this case, you have no worries. You have literally nothing to
hide, so you have no need for the privilege. "The privilege is only
there to hide wrongdoing or, in the best case, to hide something em-
barrassing, the wrongness or rightness of which is vague and uncer-
tain," one might say, "and since we have no uncertainty in this case
there is accordingly no need of the privilege." This is one extreme
argument on behalf of waiver advocates to which the hypothetical
situation involving certainty of innocence lends itself.
Here is another extreme argument that the same condition offers to
advocates not of waiver, but of the privilege: "If we truly have certain
innocence and nothing that arguably constitutes wrongdoing here,
then there is nothing for the public to gain from private waiver of the
privilege. You are not going to learn anything that is going to enable
you better to enforce the law ex post. All you are going to learn is that
we are innocent. So, you have really no need for our waiving the pri-
vilege."
In the case of true certainty of innocence, then, there is not a very
strong argument for the privilege or for waiver of the privilege. Good
arguments for one or the other gain traction only in the face of uncer-
tainty of innocence, owing either to uncertainty about what actually is
occurring or has occurred, or to uncertainty about what the law actu-
ally requires. The value, then, of either the privilege or its waiver
might be contingent precisely upon uncertainty of innocence. In the
absence of such uncertainty, i.e., where innocence is certain, it is al-
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together easy to level absolutist, simplistic cookie-cutter style argu-
ments against privilege and waiver alike. And so advocates of the two
positions, not surprisingly, typically fall back on scenarios involving
certainty and then level such mutually canceling absolutist arguments,
in turn giving rise to ironies of the kind cited.
Matters are somewhat similar in the case of certain guilt rather
than certain innocence, though now in a more one-sided way: here it
is very easy to argue both, on behalf of the private defendant, that the
privilege is crucial (though of course not legitimately so, from the
point of view of the public interest) and, on behalf of the private
plaintiff or the general public, that waiver of the privilege is crucial.
The defendant of course wants the privilege in this case for obvious
reasons. The plaintiff or prosecutor, for her part, then says by way of
rejoinder, "the only reason you desire the privilege is simply to con-
ceal the evidence of your guilt. By hypothesis, the wrongdoing is or
was indeed wrong and is being, or has already been done; hence, you,
the hypothetically guilty party, cannot plausibly claim that you re-
quire the privilege in order to facilitate frank internal discussion with
a view to complying with the law." So here, in the case of certain
guilt, we again have a knock-down argument, an absolutist argument,
though this time in favor of waiver alone rather than in favor of privi-
lege. It is accordingly not altogether surprising that advocates of
waiver would often fall back upon assumed (though unstated) scenar-
ios of this sort.
But now here, of course, is where our problem lies: we seldom, if
ever, actually have clear innocence or clear guilt, at least not at the
time of the investigation, and typically not even after then. So it really
will not do to argue on the basis of cases of "clear" innocence or
"clear" guilt for the privilege or for waiver of the privilege. What you
typically have in these cases is a great deal of uncertainty concerning
what has actually happened. And/or you have fuzziness, so to speak,
concerning what the law actually required or requires. So there is
uncertainty about "the facts," and/or unclarity about "the law" and its
implications.
As to the latter-the "legal fuzz," so to speak-you commonly
hear advocates for firms saying that there has been a great welter of
regulatory growth, particularly post-Enron, and that in consequence it
is very difficult for counsel and for other personnel within firms to
know whether particular completed or contemplated actions are or are
likely to be compliant with the law or not. And it is plausible in the
case of this form of legal uncertainty to claim that you really do re-
quire that kind of privilege-assisted frankness of internal discussion in
[Vol. 57:2
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order to determine whether you ought to be acting differently in order
to comply with the law.
As to the matter of factual uncertainty, we often hear that there is
great unclarity as to what actually has happened in the wake of some
complex scandal such as that said to have occurred at Enron or
WorldCom. Partly that owes to the complexity of the transactions
themselves; and partly it owes, relatedly, to the clever tracks-covering
that in which the malfeasant parties are likely to have engaged. There
is a lot of paper to go through, so to speak, and possibly a lot has been
shredded. So "the facts" can be as unclear as the law in these cases.
But uncertainties concerning law and fact or event, as common as
these are likely to be in complex corporate scandal cases, are not the
only ones that plague us. There are at least three additional sources of
relevant uncertainty that likewise account, I suspect, for much of the
hyperbole and ultimate irony in the contemporary debate over corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege, work product, and waiver:
First, as I mentioned in passing earlier, there are uncertainties
rooted in the role-ambiguity inherent in the role of any counsel oper-
ating within our adversarial system of justice. Any counsel, including
any corporate counsel, faces uncertainties between the requirements
of zealous advocacy for the client on the one hand and serving as a
responsible officer of the court and the justice system on the other.
Second, there are potential uncertainties stenming from a species
of conceptual ambiguity, in some cases, between "information,"
which according to doctrine of course is not privileged, on the one
hand, and mere "advice" or lawyerly "opinion," to which the privi-
lege and work product doctrine actually attach, on the other. Some-
times, as we all know, it is not easy to draw a bright demarcation be-
tween these.
Finally, third, there is potential ambiguity, in the case of ex post
waiver of the privilege, between bona fide voluntariness of the waiver
on the one hand and coercion of one or another kind or degree on the
other. That is so in particular because, in the cases we are talking
about-namely, waiver that is undertaken in order to be deemed co-
operative in the already commenced investigation of a crime alleged
already to have been committed-one is seeking the benefit of lighter
sentencing. This is an inherently coercive context. And so, unsurpris-
ingly, corporate counsel often have remarked that even when waiver
might be "voluntary" in some metaphysical sense in these cases, it
often does not feel that way in any motivational sense.
Now, in all of these cases, in which there are systematic ambigui-
ties and uncertainties, it would seem pretty clear that there might in-
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deed be some room to benefit-for thefirm to benefit and for the pub-
lic policy interest in corporate compliance with the law to be ad-
vanced-from the privilege. The claim that the privilege is salutary is
at least plausible in these cases; it cannot be dismissed out of hand by
absolutist argumentation predicated on hypothetical certainties that in
fact are not present. One can make a colorable claim, for example,
that if you do encourage free and candid discussion within the firm
before possible wrongdoing takes place then you really might, to
some degree or another, enhance the likelihood ex ante that the firm is
going to comply with the law more effectively.
Symmetrically, in these cases where there is pervasive ambiguity
and uncertainty of the sorts indicated above, it is also entirely plausi-
ble, though again, not certainly correct in each case, to suggest that
waiver of the privilege, and full revelation of all pertinent information
to the prosecutors or the plaintiffs, might indeed afford some benefit
to the public interest. One can make a colorable claim, for example,
that you more fully enable those who are prosecuting legitimate
claims to find evidence of bad faith or good faith this way. There is
more opportunity for red flags to be raised, so that those who are in-
vestigating are able to ascertain where to look less expensively. And
the consequently successful investigations and prosecutions ex post
play their own role, of course, in encouraging ex ante compliance.
But now, do you see the problem here? There are colorable claims
on both sides, the privilege and the waiver sides, in precisely the situ-
ations that we are typically in fact faced with and thus actually inter-
ested in-those where there is ambiguity and/or uncertainty. But how
do you draw the appropriate balance in these cases? How do you sep-
arately weigh, then commensurate, then comparatively weigh (i.e.,
"balance") the comparative costs and benefits in these cases-the
real, rather than the caricatured, cases that we find in the public de-
bates? What common metric is there for determining "how much
gain" is likely to be realized by strict honoring of the privilege, on the
one hand, or by liberal waiver of the privilege (or through full disclo-
sure of even colorably privileged information to prosecutors or plain-
tiffs) once an investigation is underway, on the other?
Our want of an answer to the question I posed accounts, I suspect,
in very large measure for the caricature and irony of the debate over
privilege and waiver described above. Our multiple sources of ambi-
guity and uncertainty, all culminating in the grandest informational
lacuna of them all-the lack of a scalar metric along which compara-
tively to value the vectors of benefits and burdens posed by the privi-
lege and its waiver ex post-leaves us trapped with this ongoing di-
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lemma and consequently interminable cycle of absolutist argumenta-
tion, platitude, irresoluble controversy, and ongoing rhetorical irony.
Now it is precisely here, I think, that ex ante waiver proposals
prove so intriguing. To begin with, what we are talking about here is
indeed ex ante waiver, which of course means that it straightfor-
wardly is not coerced-at least not in the particularized, hence poign-
antly acute, manner that so troubles corporate counsel in the current
debate. You do not have any danger here that the waiver is being
made under a sword wielded by the court or a prosecutor or a gov-
ernment agency in circumstances where penalties already are immi-
nent for a particular person or group of persons. There is little if any
ambiguity about voluntariness in this ex ante case.
But now rather more generally and I think more importantly, the
ex ante waiver promises to eliminate that "grandest informational
lacuna of them all" that I cited a moment ago-the valuational uncer-
tainty stemming from the multiple sources of value in both the privi-
lege and its waiver. Insofar as there is measuring to be done along a
common metric of what the comparative values of waiver privilege
are, what better or more salient aggregator of that sort of valuational
information is there than our deep, liquid, and by and large informa-
tionally efficient securities market itself? For, in the final analysis,
isn't the "value" that ultimately concerns us here, when we speak of
the corporate governance regime and its optimal policing, the value of
firms to their owners? Is not the most immediately, if not indeed ex-
clusively, relevant "public" here the investing public, the sharehold-
ing public? And are not the securities markets precisely those fora in
which this sort of valuation takes place? And would not the decision
to waive privilege ex ante, or to retain it, simply be just one more
source of such value, best determined, from firm to firm, by an in-
formationally efficient market for firms' shares?
At least provisionally speaking, I am very much tempted to think
that the answer to all of these questions is "yes." And so our answer
to ex ante waiver proposals also should be, at least provisionally,
"yes." Indeed, we ought seriously to consider the prospect of develop-
ing a full menu of possible waivers and partial waivers of the same
general kind as that suggested by Professor Miller just before me. We
ought to consider it seriously precisely because it offers means, at
long last, of cutting through precisely all of that ambiguity, uncer-
tainty, and consequent caricature-mongering, argument-cycling, and
irony of which I took brief account in opening my discussion. Cer-
tainty of a sort-of the valuational sort that ultimately concerns us-
at last. If for no other reasons than these, I think one should treat vol-
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untary waiver proposals as worthy of serious consideration, experi-
mentation, and econometric tracking no matter which side one cur-
rently occupies in the ongoing contemporary debate as to whether the
privilege and work product doctrines should be strictly honored, on
the one hand, or waivable on the other. For it looks as though we
might, and for now I should emphasize "might," be able quite plausi-
bly to both keep the cake and eat it now by saying: It should be
strictly honored ex post, if and only if it has not been voluntarily
waived ex ante.
